HORRENDOUS EVILS AND THE GOODNESS
In a crisp and classic article 'Evil and Omnipotence','
J. L. Mackie emphasized that the problem is not that (1) and (2) are logically inconsistent by themselves, but that they together with quasi-logical rules formulating attribute-analyses--such as (P1) A perfectly good being would always eliminate evil so far as it could, and (P2) There are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do,
-constitute an inconsistent premiss-set. He added, of course, that the inconsistency might be removed by substituting alternative and perhaps more subtle analyses, but cautioned that such replacements of (P1) and (P2) would save 'ordinary theism' from his charge of positive irrationality, only if true to its 'essential requirements '.2 In an earlier paper 'Problems of Evil: More Advice to Christian Philosophers',3 I underscored Mackie's point a it a step further. In debates about whether the argume evil can establish the irrationality of religious belief, c be taken, both by the atheologians who deploy it a believers who defend against it, to insure that the o attribute-analyses accurately reflect that religion's unde of Divine power and goodness. It does the atheologian n to argue for the falsity of Christianity on the ground existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, pleasure-maxi incompossible with a world such as ours, because Ch never believed God was a pleasure-maximizer anyw equally, the truth of Christianity would be inad defended by the observation that an omnipotent, om egoist could have created a world with suffering cr because Christians insist that God loves other (created) than Himself. The extension of'evil' in (2) in likewise im
Since Mackie and his successors are out to show that 'the several parts of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with each other',4 they can accomplish their aim only if they circumscribe the extension of 'evil' as their religious opponents do. By the same token, it is not enough for Christian philosophers to explain how the power, knowledge, and goodness of God could coexist with some evils or other; a full account must exhibit the compossibility of Divine perfection with evils in the amounts and of the kinds found in the actual world (and evaluated as such by Christian standards). The moral of my earlier story might be summarized thus:
where the internal coherence of a system of religious beliefs is at stake, successful arguments for its inconsistency must draw on premisses (explicitly or implicitly) internal to that system or obviously acceptable to its adherents; likewise for successful rebuttals or explanations of consistency. The thrust of my argument is to push both sides of the debate towards more detailed attention to and subtle understanding of the religious system in question. As a Christian philosopher, I want to focus in this paper on the
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problem for the truth of Christianity raised by what I shall call 'horrendous' evils. Although our world is riddled with them, the Biblical record punctuated by them, and one of them-viz., the passion of Christ, according to Christian belief, the judicial murder of God by the people of God-is memorialized by the Church on its most solemn holiday (Good Friday) and in its central sacrament (the Eucharist), the problem of horrendous evils is largely skirted by standard treatments for the good reason that they are intractable by them. After showing why, I
will draw on other Christian materials to sketch ways of meeting this, the deepest of religious problems.
II
Defining the Category. For present purposes, I define 'horrendous evils' as 'evils the participation in (the doing or suffering of) which gives one reason prima facie to doubt whether one's life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to one on the whole'. Such reasonable doubt arises because it is so difficult humanly to conceive how such evils could be overcome.
Borrowing Chisholm's contrast between balancing off (which occurs when the opposing values of mutually exclusive parts of a whole partially or totally cancel each other out) and defeat (which cannot occur by the mere addition to the whole of a new part of opposing value, but involves some 'organic unity' among the values of parts and wholes, as when the positive aesthetic value of a whole painting defeats the ugliness of a small colour patch)5, horrendous evils seem primafacie, not only to balance off but to engulf the positive value of a participant's life.
Nevertheless, that very horrendous proportion, by which they threaten to rob a person's life of positive meaning, cries out not only to be engulfed, but to be made meaningful through positive and decisive defeat.
I understand this criterion to be objective, but relative to individuals. The example of habitual complainers, who know how to make the worst of a good situation, shows individuals not to be incorrigible experts on what ills would defeat the positive value of their lives. Nevertheless, nature and experience endow people with different strengths; one bears easily what crushes individual's life is/has been a great good to him whole, is invariably and appropriately how it ha him/her.6 I offer the following list of paradigmatic horrors: woman and axing off of her arms, psychophysical t ultimate goal is the disintegration of personality one's deepest loyalties, cannibalizing one's own offabuse of the sort described by Ivan Karamazov, chi phy, parental incest, slow death by starvation, par the Nazi death camps, the explosion of nuclear populated areas, having to choose which of one's ch live and which be executed by terrorists, being and/or unwitting agent of the disfigurement or d one loves best. I regard these as paradigmatic bec most people would find in the doing or suffering o facie reason to doubt the positive meaning of Christian belief counts the crucifixion of Christ ano one hand, death by crucifixion seemed to de Messianic vocation; for according to Jewish law hanging from a tree made its victim rituall definitively excluded from the compass of God's pe disqualified from being the Messiah. On the ot represented the defeat of its perpetrators' leadersh as those who were to prepare the people of God for coming, kill and ritually accurse the true Messiah, later theological understanding, God Himself.
III
The Impotence of Standard Solutions. For better or worse, the bynow-standard strategies for 'solving' the problem of evil are powerless in the face of horrendous evils.
3.1 Seeking the Reason Why In his model article 'Hume on Evil',' Pike takes up Mackie's challenge, arguing that (P1) fails to reflect ordinary moral intuitions (more to the point, I would add, Christian beliefs), and traces the abiding sense of trouble to the hunch that an omnipotent, omniscient being could have no reason compatible with perfect goodness for permitting (bringing about) evils, because all legitimate excuses arise from ignorance or weakness. Solutions to the problem of evil have thus been sought in the form of counter-examples to this latter claim, i.e., logically possible reasons why that would excuse even an omnipotent, omniscient God! The putative logically possible reasons offered have tended to be generic and global: generic insofar as some general reason is sought to cover all sorts of evils; global insofar as they seize upon some feature of the world as a whole. For example, philosophers have alleged that the desire to make a world with one of the following properties-'the best of all possible worlds',8 'a world a more perfect than which is impossible', 'a world exhibiting a perfect balance of retributive justice',9 'a world with as favourable a balance of (created) moral good over moral evil as God can weakly actualize'0-would constitute a reason compatible with perfect goodness for God's creating a world with evils in the amounts and of the kinds found in the actual world. Moreover, such general reasons are presented as so powerful as to do away with any need to catalogue types of evils one by one, and examine God's reason for permitting each in particular. Plantinga explicitly hopes that the problem of horrendous evils can thus be solved without being squarely confronted." Unfortunately, such an exercise fails to give sati Suppose for the sake of argument that horrendous ev included in maximally perfect world orders; its being constitutive of such an order would assign it that gen global positive meaning. But would knowledge of su defeat for a mother the prima facie reason provid cannibalism of her own infant, to wish that she had born? Again, the aim of perfect retributive balan meaning on evils imposed. But would knowledge torturer was being tortured give the victim who broke turned traitor under pressure, any more reason to thi life worthwhile? Would it not merely multiply reaso torturer to doubt that his/her life could turn out to b him/her on the whole? Could the truck-driver who a runs over his beloved child find consolation in the idea that " I owe the second of these distinctions to a remark by Keith DeRose in our Fall 1987 seminar on the problem of evil at UCLA. In my judgment, such an approach is hopeless. As Plantinga'4 points out, where horrendous evils are concerned, not only do we not know God's actual reason for permitting them; we cannot even conceive of any plausible candidate sort of reason consistent with worthwhile lives for human participants in them.
IV
The How of God's Victory. Up to now, my discussion has given the reader cause to wonder whose side I am on anyway? For I have insisted, with rebels like Ivan Karamazov andJohn Stuart Mill, on spot-lighting the problem horrendous evils pose. Yet, I have signalled my preference for a vision of Christianity that insists on both dimensions of Divine goodness, and maintains not only (a) that God will be good enough to created persons to make human life a good bet, but also (b) that each created person will have a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole. My critique of standard approaches to the problem of evil thus seems to reinforce atheologian Mackie's verdict of 'positive irrationality' for such a religious position.
4.1 Whys versus Hows. The inaccessibility of reasons-why seems especially decisive. For surely an all-wise and all-powerful God, who loved each created person enough (a) to defeat any experienced horrors within the context of the participant's life, and (b) to give each created person a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole, would not permit such persons to suffer horrors for no reason.'" Does not our inability even to conceive of plausible candidate reasons suffice to make belief in such a God positively irrational in a world containing horrors? In my judgment, it does not.
To be sure, motivating reasons come in several varieties relative to our conceptual grasp: There are (i) reasons of the sort we can readily understand when we are informed of them (e.g.,
the mother who permits her child to undergo painful heart surgery because it is the only humanly possible way to save its life). Moreover, there are (ii) reasons we would be cognitively, emotionally, and spiritually equipped to grasp if only we had a larger memory or wider attention span (analogy: I may be able to memorize small town street plans; memorizing the road networks of the entire country is a task requiring more of the same, in the way that proving G6del's theorem is not). Some generic and global approaches insinuate that Divine permission of evils has motivating reasons of this sort. Finally, (iii) there are reasons that we are cognitively, emotionally, and/or spiritually too immature to fathom (the way a two-year old child is incapable of understanding its mother's reasons for permitting the surgery). I agree with Plantinga that our ignorance of Divine reasons for permitting horrendous evils is not of types (i) or (ii), but of type (iii). for the former threatens to engulf the good in an individual human life with evil, while the latter guarantees the reverse engulfment of evil by good. Relative to one another, there is also disproportion, because the good that God is, and intimate relationship with Him, is incommensurate with created goods and evils alike. Because intimacy with God so outscales relations (good or bad) with any creatures, integration into the human person's relationship with God confers significant meaning and positive value even on horrendous suffering. This result coheres with basic Christian intuition: that the powers of darkness are stronger than humans, but they are no match for God! Standard generic and global solutions have for the most part tried to operate within the territory common to believer and unbeliever, within the confines ofreligion-neutral value theory. Many discussions reflect the hope that substitute attribute-analyses, candidate reasons-why and/or defeaters could issue out of values shared by believers and unbelievers alike. And some virtually make this a requirement on an adequate solution. Mackie knew better how to distinguish the many charges that may be levelled against religion. Just as philosophers may or may not find the existence of God plausible, so they may be variously attracte by Christian values of grace and redemptive sa agreement on truth-value is not necessary to c internal consistency. My contention has been that it legitimate, but, given horrendous evils, necessary fo to dip into their richer store of valuables to consistency of (1) and (2).20 I would go one step assuming the pragmatic and/or moral (I would p broadly speaking, religious) importance of believin own) human life is worth living, the ability of Chr exhibit how this could be so despite human vuln horrendous evil, constitutes a pragmatic/moral/rel sideration in its favour, relative to value schemes t To me, the most troublesome weakness in what I lies in the area of conceptual under-development. Th that God suffered in Christ or that one person can another's pain require detailed analysis and art metaphysics and philosophy of mind. I have should this burden elsewhere,"2 but its full discharge is we scope of this paper. reasonableness of our present progress coul deed, and that though everyone from the cre world, on whatever theory, had held it to be knew it would be unnecessary and bad. .. Tolstoy's most recent biographer, whose tran paragraph of Tolstoy's Confession is used her Tolstoy was unable to sleep for days after w execution. By secular analogy with Marilyn Ad this is undoubtedly a case of horrendous evil, Tolstoy. His sensibilities were outraged and h countenance any way in which that practice coul with a theory of human law based upon the progress. Equally, he finally lost any belief in powers of the state. Interestingly, however, othe event without similar alienating consequence some cases the differences are to be explained hardening of the arteries of sensibility or of she and in others in terms of the elaborate rationale society at large.
Nonetheless there are several points of differenc horrendous evil and Tolstoy's response to it, and Professor Adams to the horrendous evils which she enumerates and defines. Most significantly Professor Adams argues that within Christian theism there are resources available adequate to 'engulf and even 'defeat' the worst of horrendo evils. I propose to use the contrast with the Tolstoy example t attempt to clarify the basis upon which she makes this importa claim. Initially it should be noted that there are three particula significant differences.
In the first place, in tones which would have been congenial t Ivan Karamazov, Tolstoy writes, ... though everyone from the creation of the world, on whatever theory had held it to be necessary, I knew i would be unnecessary and bad ...
His moral vision is trusted on this point beyond anything else This primacy of the moral is not explicitly rejected by Profess
Adams, but, as I hope to show, it is implicitly set aside. In the second place, in a way that is quite critical for Adams' case there are fundamentally immanent parameters to Tolstoy's example of horrendous evil and his reaction to it. The essence of the Christian case as outlined by Adams is that the only solution lies in extending these parameters to include the possibility of 'transcendent' good which can be set against immanent horrendous evil. The two points are related to one another in ways which will bear further exploration.
There is a third general point highlighted by the Tolstoy example which may or may not be of real significance. It is this. I am using the expression 'horrendous evil' via Tolstoy in a way which may call in question the definition offered by Professor Adams (Section III-Defining the Category). She seems there to limit 'horrendous evils' to evils in which we, who use the term, participate either by 'doing or suffering' them. In fact my use of the term is wider than that qualification strictly allows. Tolstoy, like Ivan, views as horrendous the evils suffered by others to which they have only a secondary relation involving neither the doing nor the primary suffering. The importance of this extension will become apparent in due course.
II
The strength of Professor Adams' case can be measured by our success in finding relevant differences between the Christian's response to the horrendous evils which she defines and enumerates and Tolstoy's response to the efficient horrors of the guillotine which he witnessed. She offers two main but interrelated suggestions which can help us plot what these differences are. The first is to draw a distinction between 'Why?' answers to the problems which these evils pose, and 'How?' answers. The second is to stress that God is a being greater than which cannot be conceived, a good incommensurate with both created goods and temporal evils.
In this section of the paper I wish to examine the first of these points and its implications for religious belief, all the time bearing in mind Professor Adams' insistence that her paper is primarily concerned with the internal consistency of Christian proposes that since we cannot in this area at least find reasons for rejecting sceptical conclusions by defeating those conclusions in terms recognisable to the sceptic, we should look rather for the ways in which (how) God might reassure the believer by trumping ('defeating') the evil Ace of Clubs with the great and good Ace of Hearts. Before we turn to the question of what content to give to the 'Ace of Hearts', we must first consider the implications of the replacement of the language of persuasion by the language of reassurance. The first question which must arise is whether this tactic is designed to deny altogether that there is an intellectual question at stake here at all. The spirit as well as the letter of Professor Adams' paper makes it clear that she is not advocating such a radical proposal. Christian belief is still concerned with reasons and reasonableness. The role of reason in this particular topic is to deny the adequacy of candidates for answer to the question of why God permits horrendous evils. I am unclear whether, according to Adams, reason tells us that we are 'cognitively, emotionally, and/or spiritually too immature to fathom'. I suspect, to be more precise, that Adams would claim that within the system of Christian beliefs which she inhabits it is plausible, and therefore up to a point reasonable, to assume such a degree of immaturity.
If that is the case then the question becomes one of what happens to the intellectual Why-question within this substitution of the language of reassurance for the language of persuasion.
Clearly Adams does not discount the importance of these questions. Why else should she wrestle with them in such persistent fashion? Even less does she follow those who would discount them as foolish or even in some unspecified sense 'unreal' questions. Her paper suggests that our immaturity shows itself not in the questions, as some would allege, but in the inability to perceive answers. Thus we must assume that the Why-questions are somehow displaced from the centre of our preoccupations, and properly so in the light of reassurances given.
Let us consider such a proposal first by reference to Tolstoy's horror at the execution. Interestingly, as we noticed, he was surrounded by people who felt no such horror. For Tolstoy the question 'Why?' had no acceptable answer. Thus there was no context within which his sense of horror might be dispelled. The possible explanations for the absence of this sense of horror in those around could imply that some adequate explanation of why this should happen in this manner could be given. Tolstoy unequivocally rejects this possibility as, mutatis mutandis, does Professor Adams, so we need pursue it no further in this paper. Two other possibilities occur, the first of which Adams would certainly reject, although as a matter of fact there are those, including Tolstoy in other contexts, who would level this as a serious charge against some forms of religious belief. This is the possibility that those who see no horror in the execution, or, in the religious context, see no horrendous evils, are simply cold or indifferent. Again we can leave this explanation aside since although as a matter of fact it may be the correct one in individual cases, there is no necessary connection between this attitude and religious belief. (Tolstoy's reasonably consistent anarchism however, did see a causal connection between the state and such moral corruption.)
The second possibility is a more serious though less clear matter. In the context of the guillotine it amounts to the proposal that the Why-question is deflected or displaced by engaging the intellect and associated emoti perhaps by bread and circuses or some twent equivalences such as the cry of 'law and order' or every pot'. For Tolstoy such subjugation of primary moral emotion would be anathema an achieved by change in moral belief and moral pe refusing to accept that any end could morally ju this means. His case then depends upon the af there is no rational or moral argument which ca of the error of his moral perception that executi is horrendously evil.
What could such an argument, rational and mo It would have to have as its end product either a in Tolstoy's moral perception, or alternatively it upset the whole applecart of Tolstoy's mor sensibilities. In the former case it could in princ by the sort of elaborate and persuasive argumen the Socratic Dialogues, where Socrates' uns versational companions were led to re-evaluate beliefs such as in Republic I that justice is the strongest. In the latter case what would be req perhaps persuasion to accept a radical form of m such that the force of particular moral feelings, would be, to use Professor Adams' expression 'defeated'. Implicit in the passages quoted from Tolstoy, and explicit elsewhere in Tolstoy's writings is the proposal of an alternative, and he claims, more plausible hypothesis compatible with and therefore supporting the primacy of his moral sensibilities: it is in the interests of the state not only to offer rationalisation of the practice of execution by guillotine, but to distract ('corrupt' is his term) the attention which otherwise the citizen might give to this event.
Now the point of all this is not here to defend Tolstoy's views but to use this case of secular horror to highlight quite precisely what it is that Professor Adams must achieve if she is to displace in the religious case the Why-question with the How-question, and do this by identifying forms of reassurance available within the religious tradition which are not paralleled elsewhere. She indicates in principle agreement with this diagnosis in writing:
In my opinion, the reasonableness of Christianity can be maintained in the face of horrendous evils only by drawing on resources of religious value theory, and,
In the spirit of Ivan Karamazov, I am convinced that the depth of horrific evil cannot be accurately estimated without recognising it to be incommensurate with any package of merely non-transcendent goods and so unable to be balanced off, much less defeated thereby.
That is to say, mutatis mutandis, if the Tolstoy example is one of horrendous evil, of course there can be rationally or morally persuasive argument which engulfs or defeats the horror either by adequate explanation or by bringing a change in moral evaluation by proposing a different balance of immanent goods.
To return to an earlier, and, I hope, not over-frivolous comparison, Tolstoy is in a no-Trump game. There is, at the immanent level, no trump suit, and the Ace of Hearts cannot 'defeat' the Ace of Clubs.
In the game in which Professor Adams plays, however, the Ace of Hearts will triumph, because it represents a transcendent good, and we must now consider the implications of this for our account of the nature of the religious/Christian belief. The central point which arises from the comparison with Tolstoy's example is that at its minimum the defeat of the horrendous evil requires a significant qualification of the initial moral perceptions and commitments which lead to the classification of evils as horrendous evils. That is to say, the individual must, in the end come to the view that viewed in a proper light horrendous evils are not so bad after all! Whereas in the secular case, Tolstoy cannot conceive of immanent goods which in compensation or reassurance will bring him to such a view, it is claimed that in the religious case the believer does have access to transcendent goods which can so defeat horrendous evil.
It would be as well at this stage to remind ourselves of what seemed a minor point made at the very end of the first section of this paper. For Tolstoy, in part, the horror of what he witnessed arises because it is happening to someone else and because it is being done to that person. (The poor victim however might well have drawn no significant richer differences in t between death by guillotine, by firing squad, by or by sudden massive coronary. It would require and subtle mind to draw such distinctions at tha nearly finished history.) Although she cites with Karamazov it is not wholly clear from her p Professor Adams takes on board fully the po horrifies Ivan is that these awful things sho others-in his examples to small children. Professor Adams' position about whether she is re discussion to the horrendous evils which we indiv or whether her 'solution' applies also to our percep horrendous in the suffering of others (cf. Tolsto
In the former case it may well be that the trans which Adams posits (if they are real) can defeat the impact of horrendous suffering. Most of u secular, immanent, analogues of this in our own grief is finally displaced; the pain does ultimately disappear; the harm done ceases to fill the horizon because it is overtaken by a greater good. Even here, however, there is a difference between the reasons which might lead one to say, 'Painful though it was, I'm glad that I was turned down for that job'. In one case the reason might be, 'Because I now realise they were right in their judgement and I would not have been up to it'. There one's beliefs about the justice of the original judgement have undergone change. In a second case, the reason might be, ' Because since then the UGC has recommended closure of that Department. However', one might add, 'that does not change the fact that it was quite unjust to appoint Bloggs instead'. Here, one's sense of justice, right or wrong, is unaltered.
On one account of Professor Adams' position the reassurance does not alter the original moral assessment that these evils are horrendous, because it is a How-answer-a displacement of the question-rather than a Why-answer-a persuasion that our judgement was clouded at the time. My difficulty with this conclusion, if it is the one reached by Adams, is that it is not only the question which is displaced. The moral sensibilities and beliefs which gave form to the question are also displaced, and that is a high price (indeed, I should say, too great a price) to pay. I believe in fact that the difficulties become even more acute if we agree that horrendous evils are not restricted to those evils which we directly suffer, but include (in fact for Ivan were preeminently) evils which we perceive others to suffer and which because of that, horrify us.
III
We must now consider further the second main element of Adams' case for the consistency of the Christian's refusal to be overwhelmed by horrendous evils: that there are transcendent goods which engulf and defeat horrendous evil: this defence both stands as a separate proposed bulwark, and (as we have seen) is also one of the ways in which the substitution of How-questions for Why-questions might be supported (see p. 305).
Professor Adams' view is that there are goods or values not dreamt of in the view of those who believe that recognition of horrendous evils is incompatible with Christian belief:
... philosophical and religious theories differ on what valuables they admit into their on Thus the resolution of the matter seems to be in terms of recognising different theories which differ precisely on the point of whether there are within the one transcendent goods which will defeat the horrendous evils recognised by both.
The distinction between 'engulfing' and 'defeating' horrendous evils plays an important part in this section of Professor Adams' exposition. Thus she claims that, for example, face to face intimacy with God would engulf horrendous evils in the sense that within the context of the participant's life (they) would vouchsafe to that individual a life that was a great good to him/her on the whole. The 'defeat' of horrendous evils, however, seems to be an even more difficult conception to grasp and not surprisingly at the tail end of a paper Professor Adams is not unaware of the need for fuller development of the very complex theological notions to which she alludes.
Notwithstanding the problems in either case, there is a number of more general comments which can be made, and which can be introduced by offering specific questions for Professor Adams' consideration.
1. What of those others who suffer? Ivan's question will continue to force itself upon us which is why the Tolstoy example is pertinent. Either, Professor Adams accepts that 'horrendous evils' are not restricted to this suffering which I experience, in which case how does my face-to-face intimacy with God help? Or, she restricts 'horrendous evils' to this harm which I suffer and her thesis is much less far-reaching than had first appeared. (See earlier pp. 317-8). Sometimes it would seem that the mysterious ways in which God moves have a dark selective underside, or alternatively that the believer is committed to the belief that the victim is responsible for being so immature as to see him or herself only as victim. The latter may be so in some cases, and therapy has been known to help, but as
Professor Adams agrees, in this discussion we are considering horrendous evils which have no non-transcendent counterweights.
3. Is there a common moral language between believers and non-believers? On the face of it Professor Adams' response to this question seems to be, 'Yes and No'. The affirmative element can be traced to the common moral response to 'horrendous evils', shared by believer and non-believer. The negative element is based upon Professor Adams' insistence on the distinction between 'religious value theory' (p. 306) and 'religion-neutral value theory' (p. 309).
Believers recognise a range of goods (transcendent) which have no place in the moral language of non-believers. This raises a further important question about the relation of the view of the non-believer to that of the believer to which we must now turn.
What does such a theory as that offered by
Adams do to our moral sensibilities and percep the believer it allows the possibility of both engu defeating horrendous evils. But does this possibil also the engulfing and defeat of at least some ele our moral sensibilities and perceptions? What take place in the believer who is thus reassure already ruled out the possibility that Adams is ad a form of indifference comparable to those in th who did not share Tolstoy's horror at exec guillotine, and I must assume that the sort of the based assurance being proposed is much mo sophisticated warm glow within. 
Is defeat then accomplished by a shift in moral pers

